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n response to the emerging ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve
decided to increase the liquidity of the banking system. For this purpose,
the Federal Reserve introduced or expanded a number of programs that
made it easier for banks to borrow from it. For example, commercial banks
were able to obtain additional loans through the TermAuction Facility, which
the banks would then hold in their reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve.
As a result of the combined ﬁnancial market interventions, the balance sheet
of the Federal Reserve increased from about $800 billion in September 2008
to more than $2 trillion in December 2008. Over the same time period, the
reserve accounts of commercial banks with the Federal Reserve increased
from about $100 billion to $800 billion. In late 2008 the Federal Reserve also
announcedaprogramtopurchasemortgage-backedsecurities(MBS)anddebt
issued by government-sponsored agencies. Since then, outright purchases of
agency MBS and agency debt have essentially replaced short-term borrowing
by commercial banks on the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet,
and the volume of outstanding reserves increased again to about $1.1 trillion
bytheendof2009. Giventhemagnitudeofoutstandingreserves,thereissome
concern these reserves might limit policy options once the Federal Reserve
decides to pursue a more restrictive monetary policy. Yet, another change in
theavailablepolicyinstrumentsmightlessenthisconcern: StartinginOctober
2008, the Federal Reserve began to pay interest on the reserve accounts that
banks hold with the Federal Reserve System.
How should one think about monetary policy when reserve accounts earn
interest? Tostudythisissue,Iintroduceastylizedbankingsectorintoasimple
baseline model of money that is at the core of much research in monetary
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economics. InthisframeworkIaddressanadmittedlyrathernarrowtheoretical
question, but this question is fundamental to any theory of monetary policy.
Namely, does the payment of interest on reserves affect issues of price level
determinacy? An indeterminate price level might be undesirable since it can
give rise to price level ﬂuctuations driven by self-fulﬁlling expectations. In
thiscontextitisshownthattheamountofoutstandingreserveshasonlylimited
implications for the conduct of monetary policy.
Priceleveldeterminacyisstudiedinatheoreticalframeworkthatspeciﬁes
not only monetary policy, but also ﬁscal policy, e.g., Leeper (1991) or Sims
(1994). Monetary policy is described as setting a short-term nominal interest
rate in response to inﬂation, and ﬁscal policy is described as setting the pri-
mary surplus in response to outstanding government debt. For the baseline
monetarymodelwithoutabankingsector, oneobtainspriceleveldeterminacy
if monetary policy is active, that is, it responds strongly to the inﬂation rate,
and ﬁscal policy is passive, that is, it responds strongly to government debt.1
Price level determinacy is also obtained when monetary policy is passive and
ﬁscal policy is active. For the modiﬁed model with a banking sector, I ﬁnd
that this characterization of price level determinacy is not materially affected,
whether or not interest is paid on reserves. I obtain a determinate price level
when monetary policy is sufﬁciently active and ﬁscal policy is sufﬁciently
passive, or vice versa. Furthermore, the magnitude of outstanding reserves
may not matter at all, and if it does matter the impact of reserves is small.
Earlier theoretical work on paying interest on reserves was concerned
that this policy would lead to price level indeterminacy. Sargent and Wallace
(1985) argue that, depending on how interest on reserves is ﬁnanced, an equi-
librium might not exist or the price level might be indeterminate.2 In terms of
the above characterization of monetary and ﬁscal policy, these results obtain
because the assumed ﬁnancing schemes for interest on reserves make mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy both passive or both active. My results are in line with
the recent work of Sims (2009), who studies the monetary and ﬁscal policy
coordination problem when interest is paid on money in a baseline monetary
model. The results are also related toWoodford’s discussion (2000) of mone-
tary policy as an interest rate policy in environments where the role of money
is diminished over time.
The framework of this article is not suited to address the question of
whether interest on reserves allows a separation of monetary policy from
credit policy as suggested by Goodfriend (2002) and Keister, Martin, and
McAndrews (2008). In this article I use a reduced form representation of liq-
uidity preferences by households to model distinct household demand
1 The terminology follows Leeper (1991).
2 Smith (1991) raises similar concerns on price level determinacy in an extended version of
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functions for cash, bank demand deposits, and government bonds, but the
model of the ﬁnancial system’s attitude toward the liquidity of assets in the
ﬁnancial system is even more rudimentary. First, I do not allow for credit
risk; and second, the banks’ attitudes toward liquidity risk are captured by
one exogenous parameter, the desired ratio of liquid assets to deposits. The
fact that the volume of reserves is of only limited relevance for price level
determinacy therefore does not say anything about the ability of reserves to
enhance the liquidity of the ﬁnancial system.
The analysis of the conduct of monetary policy when interest is paid on
reserves is based on a stylized model of the economy. Before proceeding
withthisanalysisIwillreviewthemechanicsoftheFederalReserve’sinterest
rate policy in the next section. This section also provides an opportunity to
describe how the interventions of the Federal Reserve in ﬁnancial markets in
2008 affected its ability to conduct interest rate policy. Section 2 then reviews
Leeper’s joint analysis (1991) of monetary and ﬁscal policy in a baseline
monetary model, and Section 3 adds a stylized banking sector to the baseline
monetary model. The banking model of this section introduces the payment
of interest on reserves into a simpliﬁed version of the environment studied by
Canzoneri et al. (2008). Section 4 concludes.
1. THE MECHANICS OF INTEREST RATE POLICY
Mostcentralbanksimplementmonetarypolicythroughaninterestratepolicy.
That is, they target a short-term interest rate and adjust their target in response
to changes in economic conditions. Federal Reserve monetary policy appears
to be well-approximated by a policy rule that increases the targeted interest
rate more than one-for-one in response to an increase of the inﬂation rate and
decreasesthetargetedinterestrateinresponsetodeclinesineconomicactivity
asmeasuredbyadeclininggrossdomesticproductgrowthrateoranincreasing
unemployment rate. This kind of behavior has become known as the Taylor
rule. Theshort-terminterestratethattheFederalReservetargetsisthefederal
funds rate—that is, the interest rate that U.S. banks charge each other for
overnight loans. This section provides a short review of the mechanics of how
the Federal Reserve inﬂuences the federal funds rate, and how paying interest
onreservesaffectsitsabilitytotargetthisrate. Thereviewtakesaverystylized
viewofthefederalfundsmarket,asinEnnisandWeinberg(2007). Foramore
detailed description of the process see Ennis and Keister (2008).
Commercialbanksarerequiredtoholdparticularassets(reserves)against
their outstanding liabilities. How many reserves a bank has to hold depends
on the types and amounts of its outstanding liabilities. Assets that qualify as
reserves are vault cash and accounts with the central bank. Banks hold ac-
counts with the central bank not only to satisfy reserve requirements, but also
to facilitate intraday transactions. Private agents engage in transactions and156 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly

























use their bank accounts to settle payments associated with these transactions.
Since not everybody is using the same bank, these payment settlements result
in corresponding payment settlements between banks during a business day.
Banksusetheiraccountswiththecentralbanktoimplementthesesettlements.
A payments transfer from one bank to another can be settled through a debit
(credit) to the paying (receiving) bank’s account with the central bank. Total
inﬂows and outﬂows to a bank’s account with the central bank during a day
need not balance, and at the end of the day a bank’s account may have in-
creased or decreased. Furthermore, there is some randomness to settlement
transactions and the bank is uncertain as to its end-of-day balance with the
central bank.
The uncertainty about payment ﬂows creates a problem for banks since
they have to hold a certain balance with the central bank at the end of the day
in order to satisfy their reserve requirement. Suppose that at the beginning of
the day a bank has some amount of money and has to decide how much to
allocate to its reserve account and how much to borrow/lend overnight with
other banks at the federal funds rate. If the bank does not allocate enough
to its reserve account and at the end of the day its balance falls short of its
reserve requirement, it can borrow from the central bank at a penalty rate,A. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 157
RP.3 Alternatively, if at the end of the day the bank’s reserve account exceeds
its reserve requirement, then the bank foregoes some interest income if the
interest rate paid on reserve accounts, RR, is lower than the federal funds rate.
The optimal response of banks to this settlement uncertainty creates a
precautionary demand for reserves, D, that depends on the federal funds rate
(Figure 1). The federal funds rate cannot exceed the penalty rate since banks
can always borrow at the penalty rate. If the federal funds rate is below the
penalty rate but above the interest rate paid on reserves, then the foregone
interest income represents an opportunity cost to holding reserve balances.
This opportunity cost, however, is declining in the federal funds rate and
banks are willing to hold more reserves at lower federal funds rates. Finally,
if the federal funds rate is equal to the interest on reserves, then there is no
opportunity cost to holding reserves and the demand for reserves becomes
inﬁnitelyelastic. Theequilibriumfederalfundsrateisboundedbythepenalty
rate and the interest rate on reserves, and, given the demand for reserves, it is
determined by the supply of reserves, S.
IntheshortruntheFederalReservecontrolsthefederalfundsratethrough
actions that affect the supply of reserves. The particular operating procedure
for the Federal Reserve has been that the market desk at the NewYork Federal
Reserve Bank forecasts the daily demand for reserves and then injects or
withdraws reserves in order to equalize the predicted federal funds rate with
the federal funds rate target set by the FOMC. Except for unusual events,
the “effective” federal funds rate during the day—that is, the rate at which
intrabank loans occur—is usually very close to the federal funds target rate
(Figure 2a).4 At times, when the Federal Reserve injects large amounts of
liquidity for reasons other than interest rate policy, this is no longer true.
For example, in response to the events of September 11, 2001, the Federal
Reserve wanted to ensure the stability of the ﬁnancial system and injected
large amounts of reserves. This action resulted in an effective federal funds
rate that was substantially below the target rate (Figure 2b). At the time,
this divergence between perceived liquidity needs and interest rate policy was
not considered to be a problem since the liquidity provision was viewed as
temporary and to be reversed in a short period of time.
3 In the United States, banks can borrow from the Federal Reserve against pre-approved
collateral at the discount window. The discount rate is set higher than the federal funds target
rate, usually 100 basis points (bp). As part of the response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the Federal
Reserve kept the discount rate at 25bp above the target federal funds rate from April 2008 until
February 2010. A bank’s effective borrowing rate is presumably higher than the discount rate since
a bank’s borrowing from the discount window is seen as a negative signal on the bank’s balance
sheet condition.
4 Interbank lending proceeds through bilateral arrangements and, during the day, the negotiated
lending rates can ﬂuctuate substantially. The effective federal funds rate is a value-weighted average
of the different loan rates.158 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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After the September 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Federal
Reserve increased liquidity substantially in response to the widening ﬁnancial
crises. This was accomplished through the expansion of existing programs,
such as theTermAuction Facility and swap lines to foreign central banks, and
the creation of new facilities, such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility.
As a result, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet more than doubled over three
months and the supply of reserves increased almost tenfold. Even if banks’A. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 159
demand for liquid assets increased at the time, the increase in the supply of
reserveswaslargeenoughtodrivetheeffectivefederalfundsratesigniﬁcantly
below the stated federal funds target (Figure 2c).
Unlike the events of September 11, 2001, the divergence in this case be-
tweeneffectiveandtargetfederalfundsratescreatedaproblemfortheconduct
of interest rate policy since the increased liquidity provision was not viewed
as a short-lived measure. To deal with this problem, the Federal Reserve in
October2008startedpayinginterestonreserves.5 TheFederalReserveBoard
initially set the interest rate on reserves below the target federal funds rate,
but by early November 2008, after several modiﬁcations, the interest rate on
reserves was essentially the target federal funds rate.6
Therationaleforthispolicyisbasedonthediscussionabovethatsuggests
thatpayinginterestonreservesputsaﬂoortothefederalfundsrate(Figure1).
Thus, even if the Federal Reserve increases the supply of reserves to a point
where the demand for reserves becomes inﬁnitely elastic, e.g., S  in Figure
1, the federal funds rate should not fall below the rate paid on reserves. This
suggests that with interest on reserves the Federal Reserve can separate the
provision of liquidity from its interest rate policy, e.g., Goodfriend (2002).
Furthermore, once the Federal Reserve pays interest on reserves, it has the
choice between two policy instruments: It can continue to target a market
interestrate, suchasthefederalfundsrate, abovetheinterestpaidonreserves;
oritcanincreasethesupplyofreservessufﬁcientlyandbringthefederalfunds
rate down to the interest paid on reserves and then adjust the interest rate it
pays, e.g., Lacker (2006). The ﬁrst approach targets a lending rate for banks
that still contains some counterparty risk, while the second approach sets the
risk-free lending rate for banks.
The actual experience with interest on reserves does not completely sup-
port this argument. Since November 2008, the effective federal funds rate
has been consistently below the interest rate paid on reserves. In fact, start-
ing in December 2008, the FOMC decided to announce a target range for
the federal funds rate between 0 and 25bps. This continues to be the policy
as of the writing of this article. On the positive side, since February 2008,
the effective federal funds rate has traded closer to the interest rate paid on
5 In 2006 Congress authorized the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves starting in
2011. At the time, the main motivation for paying interest on reserves was to eliminate the “tax
distortion” implied by the absence of interest payments on reserves. For example, banks would
engage in activities whose sole purpose was to minimize their holdings of “reservable” accounts.
6 On October 6, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board announced that it would pay interest on
the depositary institutions’ reserve account at 10bp (75bp) below the federal funds rate target for
required (excess) reserves. On October 22, the Board changed the rate paid on excess reserve
balances to the lowest Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) target rate in effect during the
reserve maintenance period less 35bp. Finally, on November 5, 2008, the rate on required reserves
was set equal to the average target federal funds rate over the reserve maintenance period, and
the rate on excess balances was set equal to the lowest FOMC target rate in effect during the
reserve maintenance period.160 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
reserves. Various reasons have been advanced for this divergence between the
effective federal funds rate and the interest rate on reserves. For example, in
late 2008 participants in the federal funds market may have been preoccupied
witheventsotherthantryingtoexploitallproﬁtopportunitiesinthemarketfor
overnightcredit. Morerecentlyithasbeenarguedthattheloweffectivefederal
funds rate originates from particular lenders in the federal funds market—the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie May and Freddy Mac—
who do not have interest-bearing reserve accounts with the Federal Reserve
(for example, Bernanke [2009] or Bech and Klee [2010]). Arbitrage compe-
tition of depository institutions that can borrow from the GSEs and deposit
the proceeds in their interest-bearing reserve accounts should eliminate any
spreads between the effective rate and the reserve rate. This competition ap-
pears,however,tobelimitedsincetheGSEsapparentlyonlyengageinlending
activities with a limited number of banks.
Fortheanalysisofaninterestratepolicywhenreservesarepayinginterest,
I will abstract from the issues just discussed and assume that the interest rate
paid on reserves is the market interest rate. First, for monetary policy I am
interested in the opportunity cost to banks, which is the rate on reserves. For
this analysis it is irrelevant that nonbank institutions drive the effective rate
below the rate on reserves; and even if arbitrage by depositary institutions
does not completely eliminate the spread between the rate on reserves and
the effective rate, it will at least bound that spread. Second, for the types
of aggregate models used in monetary policy analysis, there is no meaningful
conceptofcounterpartyrisk. Thus,thereisnoriskpremiumthatdistinguishes
the interbank lending rate from the riskless rate paid by reserves. Third, these
models are not speciﬁed in terms of overnight interest rates, but interest rates
on short-term government debt. Given that the choices for the policy rates
tend to be highly persistent over short periods, this seems like a reasonable
approximation. Figure 3 displays the effective federal funds rate and several
other short-term interest rates from 1980 to present.7 As is apparent from
Figure 3, most of the time the different short-term interest rates track the
federal funds rate quite closely.
In what follows I will study an interest rate policy that pays interest on all
reserves at the market interest rate. In particular, I will study the implications
of interest on reserves for price level determinacy, and to what extent the
amount of outstanding reserves matters. Before proceeding to the model with
interestonreservesIﬁrstoutlinetheframeworkofanalysisforthecasewithout
interest on reserves.
7All data are described in detail in the Appendix.A. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 161
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2. A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK FOR THEANALYSIS OF
MONETARYAND FISCAL POLICY
The following model of an endowment economy has been used extensively
in the study of monetary policy. There is one consumption good, ct, and
the consumption good is in exogenous supply. There are two nominal assets
issued by the government: ﬁat money, Mt, and bonds, Bt. The price of the
consumption good in terms of ﬁat money is Pt, and since the consumption
goodistheonlygood,Pt isalsothepricelevel. Inﬂationisthepricelevel’srate
of change from one period to the next, πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt. Bonds pay interest
at the gross rate Rb,t, but ﬁat money does not. I deﬁne real balances and real
bonds in units of the consumption good as mt = Mt/Pt and bt = Bt/Pt.
Households can use both, money and bonds, to save, but holding money
alsoprovidessometransactionsserviceswhenhouseholdspurchaseconsump-
tion goods. If it was not for the transactions services, households would not
want to hold money when bonds pay a positive interest rate since money
does not pay any interest. The demand for real balances, equation (1), de-
pends negatively on the opportunity cost of holding money, i.e., the foregone162 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
interestincome,andpositivelyontherealtransactionsvolume,ct. Thedemand
for bonds is determined by the Euler equation (2), which equates households’
willingness to exchange consumption today for consumption tomorrow with
therateatwhichhouseholdscandothatusingbonds. Thelatteristherealrate
of return on bonds—that is, how much of the consumption good you obtain
tomorrow if you invest one unit of the consumption good today in a nominal
bond. Equations (1) and (2) can be derived from simple dynamic represen-
tative agent economies that explicitly specify the preferences of households




















vt = bt + mt. (4)
Equation (3) represents the government’s budget constraint. On the left-
hand side is the new real debt issued to make interest payments and retire
the outstanding debt on the right-hand side. Since debt is nominal, inﬂation
reduces the real amount of debt to be repaid. Furthermore, the government
does not pay interest on ﬁat money. Finally, if the government collects lump
sum taxes, τt, then less new debt needs to be issued.8 Equation (4) deﬁnes
total real government debt as the sum of interest-paying real bonds and non-
interest-paying real balances.
To close the model I assume that there is an exogenous endowment of the
consumption good such that one can take the time path for consumption as
given. I also assume that monetary policy chooses the nominal interest rate
in response to the inﬂation rate, and ﬁscal policy chooses taxes in response to
outstanding real bonds,
Rb,t+1 = f (πt) and τt = g (bt). (5)
I characterize the equilibrium time paths for inﬂation, the interest rate,
real balances, real bonds, real debt, and lump sum taxes, xt =  
πt,R b,t,m t,b t,v t,τt
 
. An equilibrium is then a bounded time path for the
variables {xt} that solves the dynamic system deﬁned by equations (1)–(5).9
8A negative lump sum tax represents a transfer payment to the household. We can inter-
pret lump sum taxes as the government’s primary surplus, that is, lump sum tax revenues minus
spending net of interest payments.
9 The equilibrium time paths for real balances and debt have to remain bounded, since they
represent solutions to a dynamic optimization problem. Technically, real balances and debt have
to satisfy transversality conditions, which state that the limiting value of the discounted futureA. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 163
Monetary policy is said to be active (passive) if the nominal interest rate
responds strongly (weakly) to an increase of the inﬂation rate. Fiscal policy
is said to be active (passive) if lump sum taxes respond weakly (strongly)
to an increase of real bonds. For a local approximation of the difference
equation system, Leeper (1991) shows that for positive interest rates there
exists a unique equilibrium if monetary policy is active and ﬁscal policy is
passive,orconverselyifmonetarypolicyispassiveandﬁscalpolicyisactive.10
The existence of a unique equilibrium in terms of the inﬂation rate and real
balances implies price level determinacy. If both policies are passive then
the equilibrium is indeterminate, and if both policies are active an equilibrium
willnotexist.11 Sims(1994)showsthattheseresultsholdgloballyinLeeper’s
model (1991), and not only for local approximations.
The point of this analysis is that price level determinacy is jointly deter-
mined by monetary and ﬁscal policy. To illustrate this point, Figure 4, Panel
A1 displays the different regions that characterize equilibrium in terms of the
responsiveness of monetary and ﬁscal policy to the inﬂation rate and real debt
for a standard parameterization of the model.12 The horizontal axis displays
the elasticity of lump sum taxes with respect to real debt, γ, and the verti-
cal axis displays the elasticity of the nominal interest rate with respect to the
inﬂation rate, α. The northeast and southwest regions represent parameter
combinations for which there exist unique equilibria. The southeast region
represents parameter values in which a continuum of equilibria exists, and the
northwest region represents parameter values in which no equilibrium exists.
Theintuitionforthisdecompositionofthepolicyparameterspaceisfairly
straightforward. Substituting the interest rate policy rule (5) into the Euler
equation (2) shows that the difference equation describing the dynamics of
inﬂation is independent of ﬁscal policy. If monetary policy is active, i.e.,
it responds strongly to past inﬂation, then this difference equation deﬁnes a
unique bounded solution for inﬂation. Furthermore, if ﬁscal policy is passive,
marginal utility of real balances and debt has to be zero. Thus, real balances and debt cannot
grow too fast relative to the time discount factor.
10 For a constant consumption path, ct = c, and given policy targets for inﬂation and the
debt-consumption ratio, equations (1)–(5) deﬁne a unique time-invariant solution for the endogenous
variables, xt = x, the steady state. I deﬁne a local approximation to the equilibrium in terms of
small deviations from the steady state, which transforms the dynamic system of equations into a
linear difference equation system. For a description of conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of a bounded solution to linear difference equation system see, e.g., Sims (2000).
11 Indeterminacy or nonexistence of an equilibrium raises an issue as to how useful the pro-
posed theory is for the analysis of monetary policy. After all, we are trying to explain a particular
outcome for the economy. Indeterminacy can be resolved by reﬁning the equilibrium concept. For
example, we might assume that decisions are coordinated on an extraneous random variable that
has no relevance for the feasibility of outcomes, a sunspot. This gives rise to ﬂuctuations as a
result of self-fullﬁlling expectations. If no equilibrium exists for certain combinations of monetary
and ﬁscal policy then we might conclude that some policy rules are simply not feasible in the
long run (Sargent and Wallace [1981]).
12 Figure 4 is based on a parameterization of the economy described in Section 3.164 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Price Level Determinacy
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i.e., lump sum taxes respond strongly to government debt, then iteration on
thetransitionequationforgovernmentdebtdeﬁnedbythegovernmentbudget
constraint(3)deﬁnesauniqueboundedpathforgovernmentdebt. Conversely,
if ﬁscal policy is active, i.e., lump sum taxes respond weakly to debt, then
the unique bounded solution for debt from the government budget constraint
deﬁnes debt as the discounted present value of future lump sum taxes and
seigniorage revenue from money creation. This in turn deﬁnes a time path for
the price level and thus the inﬂation rate. The implied time path for inﬂation
need not be the same as the unique time path for inﬂation implied by an active
monetary policy. Thus, active monetary and ﬁscal policies are inconsistentA. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 165
with the existence of an equilibrium. But if monetary policy is passive, then
the difference equation describing the dynamics of inﬂation is consistent with
a continuum of bounded solutions for inﬂation, in particular the inﬂation rate
implied by the government budget constraint. This case is therefore also
known as the ﬁscal theory of the price level. Finally, if monetary and ﬁscal
policy are both passive, then there exists a continuum of bounded solutions to
the system of difference equations, that is, the equilibrium is indeterminate.
Sinceforpositiveinterestratesthereisauniquelydeﬁneddemandforreal
balances, one can think of the interest rate as being supported by open market
operations that supply the amount of money that is demanded at the given
interest rate, equation (1). If the demand for real balances is characterized by
a “liquidity trap”—that is, the demand is ﬂat at a zero interest rate—then open
market operations do not affect the equilibrium outcome.
3. INTEREST ON RESERVESAND THE CONDUCT OF
MONETARY POLICY
I now describe a simple endowment economy with a banking sector that gen-
eralizes the baseline model described in the previous section. In this model
banks are required to hold reserves, and one can study if and how the conduct
of monetary policy needs to be changed once market interest rates are paid on
reserves. I will limit attention to the question of how the payment of interest
on reserves affects price level determinacy, that is, existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium.
An Economy with a Banking Sector
Consider a representative agent with preferences over a cash good, c, a credit
good, k, real balances, mh, real demand deposits, d, and real government
bonds, bh. Including these ﬁnancial assets in preferences introduces a wedge
into the asset pricing equations because the assets pay a liquidity premium.
There is also a generic asset, a, that does not provide any liquidity services.
The demand deposits are offered by a competitive banking sector that uses
reserves and government bonds to service the demand deposits. The banking
sector also makes loans, l, to the representative agent that are used to ﬁnance
purchasesofthecreditgood. Fiscalpolicyaffectstheevolutionofgovernment
debt. The environment is a simpliﬁed version of Canzoneri et al. (2008).
Household Demand for Assets
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and the budget constraint is
ct + kt + mht + dt + bht + at − lt + τt
≤ yt +
 
mh,t−1 + dh,t−1Rdt + bh,t−1Rbt + at−1Rt − lt−1Rl,t
 
/πt, (7)
where the nominal interest rate for asset j = m,d,b, and l is Rj, the nominal
interest rate on the generic asset is R, exogenous income is y, and lump
sum taxes are τ. Real balances, demand deposits, and government bonds
are assets that provide liquidity services in addition to being a store of value.
The liquidity services are represented as direct contributions to a household’s
utility. The generic asset does not provide any liquidity services and is not
includedinthehousehold’sutilityfunction. Byassumptionthehouseholdhas
to take out a loan to purchase the credit good
kt ≤ lt. (8)
The optimal choices of the household imply the following asset demand
equations:
















Note that the household’s demand for real balances is well-deﬁned even at a
zero nominal bond rate. The household’s demand for real balances depends
on the interest rate of the generic asset and not the bond rate. Furthermore,
since bonds provide liquidity services, the bond rate will always be below the
generic asset rate. Thus, even if the bond rate is zero the household demand
for real balances is uniquely deﬁned. There is no liquidity trap for household
demand of real balances.
Intertemporal optimization with respect to the generic ﬁnancial asset im-










where the term in square brackets is the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption today and tomorrow. In the endowment economy equilibrium
consumption of the cash and credit good is exogenous. With exogenous con-
sumption, this Euler equation determines inﬂation conditional on the nominal
interest rate for the generic asset.
Two remarks are in order. First, I deviate from the standard asset pricing
setup to get potentially well-speciﬁed demand functions for real balances andA. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 167
demand deposits. Putting the assets into the utility function is one way to
get well-deﬁned demand functions. Alternatively, I could have assumed that
these assets lower transactions costs and introduced the relevant cost terms in
the budget constraint as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). Second, I want
to have a simple model of bank lending, so just assume that the “credit” good
has to be purchased through a one-period loan taken out from the bank.
Bank Demand and Supply of Assets
A bank takes in demand deposits that provide transactions services for the
household and represent a liability to the bank. The bank’s assets consist of
loans made to the household, and bond and reserve holdings, bb and mb. The
balance sheet of a bank is
lt + bbt + mbt = dt. (14)
Banks need to hold reserves and bonds to service demand deposits:
bbt + mbt = ϕdt. (15)
This equation represents an assumption on the bank’s technology, namely
what and how many assets the bank needs in order to generate the demand
deposit services for the household. I assume that the bank uses liquid assets,
i.e., bonds and reserves, in order to service demand deposits, but it need not
hold 100 percent liquid assets, ϕ<1. Furthermore, bonds and reserves are
perfect substitutes in the production of demand deposit services.
Banks may also be forced to satisfy a reserve requirement that is imposed
by a government regulator:
mbt ≥ ρdt. (16)
Alternatively, the reserve ratio can reﬂect special precautionary preferences
of banks for reserves. I assume that ρ<ϕ , otherwise banks would not hold
other liquid assets besides reserves.13
Icanassumethatthereisarepresentativebankthatbehavescompetitively
since the banking technology described above is characterized by constant
returns to scale. Whereas banks receive interest on their bond holdings, the
payment of interest on reserves (IOR), Rm ≥ 1, is a policy choice. If bonds
pay interest at a higher rate than do reserves, Rb >R m ≥ 1, then banks would
prefer to hold bonds only against their demand deposits, but they are forced to
hold at least a fraction, ρ, of their demand deposits in the form of reserves. If
IOR is paid, I assume that interest is paid at the bond rate such that banks are
13 Canzoneri et al. (2008) provide a more elaborate model of a banking sector that uses
resources and not just assets to service demand deposits, and they allow for imperfect substitution
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indifferent between reserves and bond holdings, Rm = Rb.14 To summarize,
the bank demand for reserves and bonds is determined by interest rates and
reserve requirements as follows
mbt = ρdt if Rb,t+1 >R m,t+1 ≥ 1, (17)
mbt ∈ [ρdt,ϕd t] if Rb,t+1 = Rm,t+1 or Rb,t+1 = 1, (18)
bbt = ϕdt − mbt. (19)
In any case, the zero proﬁt condition for making loans and demand deposits
determines the deposit rate
Rd,t+1 = (1 − ϕ)Rl,t+1 + (ϕ − ρ)Rb,t+1 + ρRm,t+1. (20)
This model for banks’ reserve demand exhibits features of a “liquidity
trap.” First, at a zero bond rate the demand for reserves is indeterminate.
Note, however, that the range of indeterminacy is bounded by the required
reserve ratio and the desired liquid asset ratio. Second, once IOR is paid at
thebondrate, thedemandforreservesbecomesindeterminateevenatpositive
bondrates. Eventhoughthebanks’demandforreservesmaybeindeterminate
within a range, the banks’ joint demand for reserves and bonds is always
uniquely determined.
Does the proposed “banking” technology make sense? For commercial
banks the ratio of cash (including reserves with the Federal Reserve System)
plus Treasury holdings relative to deposits has been remarkably stable from
1973 to the end of the 1980s (Figure 5). There was a sharp increase in the
early 1990s and then a downward trend that has been reversed since last fall.
At the same time, there was a steady decline of the ratio of cash relative to
total deposits. Since excess reserves were small relative to required reserves
before 2008, this must reﬂect a steady decline in the required reserve ratio.
Simultaneously with the introduction of IOR in the fall of 2008 and as-
sociated with various credit and liquidity programs, the amount of reserves
banksholdwiththeFederalReserveSystemhasincreaseddramatically. These
higher reserve holdings have not been accompanied by a corresponding de-
cline of other liquid assets, such as treasuries or MBS, or by an increase of
demanddeposits(Figure5). Intermsoftheproposedsimplemodelthiswould
have to be interpreted as a substantial increase in the desired ratio of liquid
assets to deposits, ϕ.
Government Supply of Assets
The government budget constraint is
bt + mt =
 
Rb,tbt−1 + mh,t−1 + Rm,tmb,t−1
 
/πt − τt, (21)
14 In principle the policymaker could decide to make IOR greater than the bond rate, Rm >
Rb, and reserves would dominate bonds as an asset for banks. I do not consider this case.A. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 169
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where b = bh + bb is the total amount of government bonds issued and
m = mh + mb is the monetary base. In an equilibrium the total amount of
government debt has to equal the sum of bank and household bond holdings,
and the monetary base has to equal the sum of bank reserves and household
cash holdings.
Simplifying the Model
It is possible to simplify the exposition of the model considerably.15 First,
given the exogenous endowment of the cash and credit good, I can use the
household demand for loans, (12), and the zero proﬁt condition for banks,
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Icanusethisfunctioninthehousehold’sdemandfordeposits,(10),andobtain










ct if Rb,t+1 = Rm,t+1 or Rb,t+1 = 1.
Aggregate demand for real balances, the monetary base, is then the sum of






The demand for monetary base inherits a “ﬂat” indeterminacy range from the
banks’reserve demand if the bond rate is zero or interest is paid on reserves.
Analogously to the total demand for real balances, I can deﬁne a total






Corresponding to the aggregate demand for real balances, the aggregate de-
mand for bonds also inherits a “ﬂat” indeterminacy range from the banks’
demand for bonds. Aggregate demand for total government debt is the sum








































vt = bt + mt. (32)
Equation (27) is the aggregate demand for real balances. Equation (28) is
the household Euler equation for the generic asset, (13). Equation (29) is
the government budget constraint in terms of total debt outstanding v, and ˜ m
denotes non-interest-bearing government debt. Without interest on reserves,
non-interest-bearingdebtisaggregaterealbalances, ˜ m = m; andwithinterest
on reserves, non-interest-bearing debt is cash holdings by households, ˜ m =
mh. Equation (31) is the aggregate demand for government debt. EquationA. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 171
(32) deﬁnes total government debt as the sum of real balances and bonds. The
baseline model, (1)–(4), is obtained from Section 2 if one assumes that bonds
and demand deposits do not provide any liquidity services, γ b = γ d = 0;
eliminates the credit good, γ k = k = 0; and eliminates the banking sector.
Price Level Determinacy with Interest on Reserves
InowshowthatthesimplebaselinemodelfromSection2andthejustdescribed
model with a banking sector have very similar implications for how monetary
andﬁscalpolicyaffectpriceleveldeterminacy. Whetherornotinterestispaid
on reserves, the model with banking does not materially affect this result. In
particular, it appears that the volume of bank reserves does not matter.
The reduced form representation of the economy with a banking sector,
equations (27)–(32), appears to be slightly more complicated than the simple
baseline model, equations (1)–(4), but the structure of the two economies is
very similar. In order to close the model with banking, I again assume that
there are ﬁxed endowments of the consumption good, cash and credit; and
specify monetary and ﬁscal policy as responding to inﬂation and government
debt, equation (5). I again study the local properties of the linearized dynamic
systemdeﬁnedbyequations(27)–(32)andthepolicyrules(5). Inthebaseline
model, ﬁscal policy responds to the stock of outstanding real bonds, b, that is,
interest-bearing government debt. For reasons that will immediately become
apparent, I also consider a ﬁscal policy that responds to the total stock of
government debt, v. I can also do that for the simple baseline model and,
comparing PanelsA1 and B1 of Figure 4, it is clear that this has no substantial
impact on the issue of equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
In order to characterize the implications of monetary and ﬁscal policy
for price level determinacy I need to parameterize the model with banking.
Relative to the baseline model, I need to make assumptions on households’
steady-stateassetholdings(realbalances,m,bonds,b,anddeposits,d);banks’
required reserve ratio, ρ, and desired liquidity, ϕ; and on steady-state rates of
return on the generic asset, R, bonds, Rb, and money, π. I follow Canzoneri
et al.’s (2008) calibration of the 1990–2005 U.S. economy. The time period
is assumed to be a quarter. The household steady-state ratios of real balances,
bonds, anddemanddepositstoconsumptionaremh/c = 0.3, bh/c = 0.9, and
d/c = 2.45. Steady-state nominal interest rates on reserves, bonds, and the
genericassetareRm = 1,Rb = 1.011,andRa = 1.015. Steady-stateinﬂation
is π = 1.007. The reserve ratio is ρ = 0.05 and reﬂects the ratio of vault
cash and bank deposits with the Federal Reserve. The desired liquidity ratio
is ϕ = 0.30 and reﬂects the ratio of bank holdings of treasury debt, agency
debt, agency MBS, and total reserves to total deposits.172 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Fiscal Policy Targets Total Debt
Suppose ﬁrst that ﬁscal policy targets total debt, v, and that no interest is paid
on reserves. Comparing Panels B1 and B2 of Figure 4 it is apparent that the
parameter regions that characterize equilibrium existence and uniqueness are
qualitativelysimilartothebaselinemodel. Priceleveldeterminacyisobtained
in the northeast region (active monetary policy and passive ﬁscal policy) and
the southwest region (passive monetary policy and active ﬁscal policy) of the
parameter space.
Now suppose that ﬁscal policy continues to target total debt, but interest
is paid on reserves. Because of interest on reserves, total demand for real
balances is indeterminate for a range that depends on the reserve ratio and the
desired liquidity ratio of banks. Even if the total supply of real balances falls
into that range, this does not create a problem for the conduct of monetary
policy.
Consider equations (28)–(31) of the reduced form together with the mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy rules. These equations are sufﬁcient to determine
an equilibrium in terms of the inﬂation rate, interest rates, and total debt,  
πt,R t+1,R b,t+1,v t
 
, if the equilibrium exists. The allocation of total gov-
ernment debt between interest-bearing reserves and interest-bearing debt is
irrelevant. In particular, the magnitude of reserves at banks does not matter,
as long as the reserves remain within the range of indeterminacy.
Comparing Panels B2 and B3 of Figure 4 shows that paying interest on
reserves has some impact on the issue of price level determinacy. If there is
price level determinacy in the northeast region of the parameter space without
IOR, then for a given active monetary policy, ﬁscal policy with IOR has to be
somewhat more passive in order for the equilibrium to remain unique.16 Con-
versely, in the southwest region of the parameter space, for a given monetary
policy, ﬁscal policy with IOR needs to be more active to obtain price level
determinacy.
Fiscal Policy Targets Real Bonds
Now suppose that ﬁscal policy targets the stock of real bonds, b, rather than
total debt, v, but no interest is paid on reserves. Comparing Panels A2 and
B2 of Figure 4 shows that for any given monetary policy, ﬁscal policy can be
somewhat more active before losing price level determinacy, either because
of nonexistence or nonuniqueness. But now it appears that there is a problem
if interest is paid on reserves, since the demand for government bonds—
16 Recent projections of rapidly expanding ﬁscal deﬁcits might suggest that ﬁscal policy has
shifted toward a more active stance, that is, taxes are responding less strongly to outstanding debt.
If monetary policy were to remain active, ﬁscal and monetary policy could become inconsistent,
that is, an equilibrium would not exist. Thus, the payment of interest on reserves might require a
further adjustment of either monetary or ﬁscal policy to maintain the existence of an equilibrium.A. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 173
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and relatedly the demand for real balances—becomes indeterminate for some
range. A well-deﬁned demand for government bonds is, however, needed,
since ﬁscal policy is supposed to respond to the stock of outstanding bonds.
I can resolve the indeterminacy of the demand for bonds through the
introduction of an additional policy rule that determines their equilibrium
values. For example, the central bank might conduct open market operations
(OMO) that adjust real balances in response to the inﬂation rate:
mt = h(πt), (33)174 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
with an elasticity of δ. In other words, because the money demand equation,
(27), no longer determines real balances, monetary policy can choose real
balances.17
Figure 4, Panel A3 graphs the parameter regions for price level determi-
nacy when monetary policy does not adjust real balances in response to the
inﬂation rate, δ = 0. The impact of paying interest on reserves relative to not
paying interest on reserves, Figure 4, Panel A2, is similar to the case when
ﬁscal policy targets total debt and not bonds only.
How much paying IOR matters now also depends on the new OMO pa-
rameter,δ. Figure6displaystheparameterregionsforpriceleveldeterminacy
when ﬁscal policy targets real bonds and the OMO parameters are δ = 100
(Panel A), δ = 0 (Panel B), and δ =− 100 (Panel C). Given that the OMO
response to real balances is essentially a response to bank reserves, one might
think that with IOR, monetary policy would have to target both inﬂation and
bank reserves. This interpretation has to be qualiﬁed for two reasons. First,
bank reserves matter only because I have assumed that ﬁscal policy targets
bonds and not total debt. Second, the graphs in Figure 6 are based on very
extreme values for the OMO policy parameter. For δ values that are of simi-
lar magnitude as the monetary and ﬁscal parameters, α and γ, the parameter
regions for price level determinacy are essentially the same.
4. CONCLUSION
This article addresses the question of whether paying interest on the reserve
accounts that banks hold with a central bank affects the conduct of monetary
policy. ForthispurposeIintroduceastylizedmodelofbanksthatholdreserves
into a standard baseline model of money. This model suggests that paying
interest on reserves does not drastically change the implications of monetary
policy, implemented as an interest rate policy, for price level determinacy.
Furthermore, theamountofoutstandingreservesdoesnotappeartobecritical
for issues of price level determinacy.
The scope of the article is rather narrow. For example, I do not study
how the payment of IOR affects the dynamic response of the economy to
shocks for given monetary and ﬁscal policy rules. The model can be used
to address this issue if features are added that make money non-neutral, for
example, a New Keynesian Phillips curve based on sticky prices. Preliminary
results for such an augmented model suggest that for the same monetary and
ﬁscal policy rules the dynamic response of inﬂation and output to shocks does
17 We usually think of OMO as determining nominal quantities. I have chosen a policy rule
that chooses real balances to keep the exposition simple. One could interpret the proposed policy
rule as responding to inﬂation and to the price level. Alternatively, one could simply start with a
policy rule that sets the nominal money stock and study the more complicated system.A. Hornstein: Interest on Reserves 175
depend on whether or not interest is paid on reserves, but the differences are
not substantial.
The effects of ﬁnancial market interventions by central banks, however,
cannot be studied in this framework. Since the model’s concept of liquidity
for the ﬁnancial sector is rather narrow, the model has nothing to say about
central bank provision of liquidity to banks through an increase of the banks’
reserve accounts. For example, the model does not provide any rationale for
the Federal Reserve’s program to purchase agency MBS as opposed to other
governmentdebt. Indeed,thesimplebankingmodelassumesthatagencyMBS
and treasuries provide the same liquidity services to banks.18 For a critical
review of the Federal Reserve interventions in speciﬁc ﬁnancial markets that
gaverisetotheexpansionoftheFederalReserve’sbalancesheet,inparticular,
the volume of reserve liabilities, see Hamilton (2009).
APPENDIX
Figure 2 displays daily data for the federal funds target set by the FOMC and
theeffectivefederalfundsratefromJanuary2000–February2010. Inaddition,
Panel C of Figure 2 also displays the interest rate that was paid on required
reserves and on excess reserves from September 2008 on. Figure 3 displays
monthly averages from January 1980–February 2010 for the following short-
term interest rates: the effective federal funds rate, the three-month constant
maturity Treasury rate, the three-month nonﬁnancial commercial paper rate,
the rate for three-month certiﬁcates of deposit in the secondary market, and
the prime bank lending rate. Figure 5 displays monthly liquid asset ratios
of all commercial banks, domestically chartered and foreign related institu-
tions, from January 1973–January 2010 based on the Federal Reserve Board’s
H.8 table. Securities in bank credit include Treasury and agency securities
and other securities. A large part of agency securities consists of MBS is-
sued by GSEs such as the Government Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae,
GNMA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae, FNMA),
or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac, FHLMC).
OthersecuritiesincludeprivatelabelMBS,amongothers. Cashincludesvault
cashandreserveswiththeFederalReserve. Theliquidassetratioiscalculated
relative to bank deposits excluding large time deposits. All series are from
Haver.
18 Given that the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become wards of the federal
government, this does not appear to be such an unreasonable assumption. Indeed, the only reason
to distinguish between Treasury debt on the one hand and agency-issued debt and MBS on the
other hand appears to be political: GSE-issued debt does not count toward the congressionally
mandated federal debt limit.176 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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